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Abstract
This paper examines the eﬀect on economic growth and welfare of the
access to external ﬁnancing which results in technological transfers to a
developing country from the rest of the world. We consider a two-sector
stochastic growth model and compute optimal accumulation mechanisms
in the environments which diﬀer in the extent to which the borrowing con-
tracts are enforced. Furthermore, we examine diﬀerent assumptions con-
cerning the default punishment and their implications for growth, welfare
and borrowing patterns. We show that under limited commitment lack
of technological transfers may result in scarce capital ﬂows to developing
countries and substantially reduce their growth opportunities. Presence of
the technological transfers in this environment induces a developing coun-
try to use foreign capital to both smooth consumption and invest more
heavily in all the sectors of the economy including those directly unaf-
fected by the productivity beneﬁts. Our ﬁndings suggest that technologi-
cal transfers may play a role of an important enforcement mechanism. In
addition, our model can account for the rich structure of observed capital
ﬂows to low- and middle income countries.
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11 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the eﬀect on economic growth and welfare
of the access to external ﬁnancing which results in technological transfers to a
developing country from the rest of the world. We consider a stochastic growth
model with two productive sectors one of which may be aﬀected by the pro-
ductivity spillovers from abroad. We focus on the institutional aspects of the
economy and compute optimal accumulation mechanisms in the environments
which diﬀer in the extent to which the borrowing contracts are enforced. We
examine the role of two alternative assumptions about the severity of the default
punishment and their implications for growth, welfare and borrowing patterns.
Our results show that under limited commitment lack of technological transfers
may result in scarce capital ﬂows to developing countries and substantially re-
duce their growth opportunities. On the other hand, presence of technological
transfers in this environment induces a developing country to use foreign capital
to both smooth consumption and invest more heavily in all the sectors of the
economy including those directly unaﬀected by the technological diﬀusion. Our
ﬁndings suggest that technological transfers may play a role of an important en-
forcement mechanism. In addition, our model outperforms the standard models
of economic growth in its ability to account for the rich structure of observed
capital ﬂows to low- and middle income countries.
Conventional growth models have been reported to face certain diﬃculties
in accounting for the observed pattern of capital ﬂows from the industrialized to
the low- and middle income countries. These diﬃculties have often been shown
to stem from the failure to model certain margins. For instance, Barro et al
(1995) discussing international capital mobility emphasize that some forms of
capital cannot be ﬁnanced by borrowing on the world market. They show that
an open-economy version of the neoclassical model is no longer at odds with
empirical evidence on convergence once capital is viewed broadly to include hu-
man investments. The role of institutional or contractual elements is stressed by,
among others, Marcet and Marimon (1992) and Thomas and Worrall (1994).
Marcet and Marimon (1992) show that enforcement constrains may result in
negligible transfers to a developing country and severely reduce its growth op-
portunities. The objective of this paper is to follow the latter line of research by
studying optimal accumulation mechanisms in the environments with diﬀerent
degree of enforcement of contracts.
One novelty of our framework is that the access to the external ﬁnancing
is assumed to result in technological transfers to the developing countries from
the rest of the world. This assumption ﬁnds extensive empirical support in the
literature. Some of the studies emphasize the positive eﬀect on productivity
of free capital movement as such. For example, Frankel and Romer (1999)
conclude that the beneﬁts from integration for a developing country partially
stem from the transfer of ideas from the rest of the world. In line with that Global
Development Finance 2001 annual report by the World Bank (2001:59) states
that there is ample evidence indicating towards the productivity beneﬁts of the
capital ﬂows ”through transfer of technology and management techniques”.
Other studies stress the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a
mechanism of technological transfers to the developing countries from the rest
of the world. For instance, according to the World Bank (2001), depending on
the absorptive capacity, FDI has been positively associated with the productiv-
2ity of the foreign owned ﬁrms and with positive spillover to domestically owned
ﬁrms. Romer (1993) suggests that FDI has considerable potential to transfer
ideas from the industrialized countries to the developing countries. G¨ org and
Strobl (2001) provide a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on FDI
and productivity spillovers. They also give account of other channels through
which productivity spillovers may occur such as movement of highly skilled per-
sonnel, the ’demonstration eﬀect’ or the ’competition eﬀect’. FDI as a potential
mechanism of technological transfers has been particularly emphasized due to
its increasing role in the stream of international capital ﬂows to low- and mid-
dle income countries. As documented by Thomas and Worrall (1994) already
in the mid-eighties about a half of all capital ﬂows to the developing countries
took form of FDI. The fraction of FDI in the international capital ﬂows kept
increasing during the last two decades and according to International Monetary
Fund (2003) it now constitutes the most important net ﬂow for all regions.
The setup of our framework is similar to that of the full information environ-
ment of Marcet and Marimon (1992). We study a model with two agents, one
risk-averse agent representing a developing country and the other risk neutral
agent representing the rest of the world. We focus of the growth of the develop-
ing country which is assumed to have low initial level of capital. In this context,
growth is understood as a transition from the initial low level of capital towards
the steady state. We analyze the model within three environments which diﬀer
to the extent the debt contracts are being enforced. These are: (i) autarky;
(ii) external ﬁnancing with perfect enforcement of contracts; and (iii) external
ﬁnancing with limited enforcement of contracts. Under the latter regime, a de-
veloping country may at any moment appropriate the accumulated capital and
refuse to honor its debt. In this case it will suﬀer a default punishment which
will involve loss of any external ﬁnancing opportunities in the future.
We assume that there are two productive sectors in the economy, which
we refer to as domestic and foreign operated sector. Each of the sectors has
Cobb-Douglas technology. The risk averse agent decides how much to invest
in each of the sectors. The technology which converts investment into capital
goods is non-linear and aﬀected by the productivity shocks. The foreign sector
is assumed to be more productive due to technological transfers associated with
external ﬁnancing. This assumption relies on the literature review by G¨ org and
Strobl (2001) who document that in the literature it is often argued that the
positive spillovers only aﬀect certain sectors of the economy. As in Cohen and
Sachs (1986) or Eaton and Gersovitz (1994) failure to honor the foreign debt
results in permanent loss of productive eﬃciency.
We consider two modiﬁcations of the model which diﬀer in the default pun-
ishment a developing country will endure should it refuse to honor its debt
contracts. First, we analyze a model where in case of debt repudiation the
country loses not only productivity beneﬁts in the foreign operated sector but
also accumulated capital in this sector. Furthermore, the country is deprived
from the possibility to develop this sector on its own. Such assumption is used
for instance by Marcet and Marimon (1998) where they study a partnership
with limited commitment. Under this assumption, the autarkic environment,
which is hereafter referred to as one-sector autarky, is similar to the stochastic
growth model of Brock and Mirman (1972) augmented with non-linear stochas-
tic investment technology. Our key ﬁnding from this model is that technological
gains from external ﬁnancing opportunities may eliminate the default risk even
3though they aﬀect only some sectors of the economy.
The discussed above assumption of the punishment is case of deviation from
the optimal plan may be judged as extremely severe. Indeed, the defaulting
country loses not only the all the productivity beneﬁts and capital accumulated
in the foreign operated sector but also a possibility to develop this sector on its
own. Therefore, we consider a framework where in case of debt repudiation the
developing country looses the technological advantage associated with external
ﬁnancing. However, the country appropriates capital stock in all sectors of
the economy which still remain productive with the productivity level of the
domestically operated sector. Relying on this assumption we consider three
representative cases which diﬀer in the extent of the technological diﬀusion. In
the benchmark case no technological diﬀusion takes place. On the other extreme
is the case with technological transfers high enough to eliminate the risk of
default in the envoronment with imperfect enforcement of contracts. The most
interesting case is characterized by presence of the technological transfers, the
magnitude of which is not suﬃcient to ensure that the incentive compatibility
constrain never binds in the limited commitment environment.
Our ﬁndings allow to conclude that the existence of substantial capital ﬂows
from the developed to developing countries is not inconsistent with the presence
of the default risk. We overcome the diﬃculty that the models of sustained
growth have in explaining the rich structure of observed capital ﬂows and bor-
rowing patterns across low- and middle-income countries. Our framework sug-
gests that under limited enforcement the pattern of capital movements depends
heavily on the productivity beneﬁts associated with the external ﬁnancing op-
portunities.
We also conclude that technological transfers may play a role of an en-
forcement mechanism. In our framework even moderate technological beneﬁts
associated with external ﬁnancing opportunities may substantially reduce the
negative eﬀect on the welfare of the failure to perfectly enforce contracts. Pres-
ence of technological diﬀusion in the environment with limited commitment
induces a developing country to use foreign capital to both smooth consump-
tion and invest more heavily in all the sectors of the economy including those
directly unaﬀected by the technological transfers. The latter results in faster
growth and signiﬁcant welfare gains.
Since we analyze the models with participation constraints, which involve
expected values of the future variables, we are unable to use the results of stan-
dard dynamic programming. Our methodology relies on the contribution of
MarcetMarimon (1998) who have demonstrated that problems with incentive
compatibility constraints fall into a general class of problems, which can be cast
into alternative recursive framework. Our numerical analysis utilizes the para-
meterized expectation approach (PEA) introduced by Marcet (1989). Although
PEA algorithm approximates the true equilibrium at the steady state distrib-
ution with arbitrary accuracy, the policy function obtained from the long-run
simulations may not be a good approximation for the solution during the initial
periods. This is of particular importance for our analysis since we study growth
of the economy during the transition towards the steady state. To overcome
this problem we adapt a numerical algorithm introduced by Marshall (1988)
and developed by Marcet and Marimon (1992) to ﬁnd a distinct policy function
for the initial periods.
Our paper is most closely related to the studies of Marcet and Marimon
4(1992) and Maliar et al (2005). Indeed, in many aspects our setup mimics that
of the full information environment of Marcet and Marimon (1992). In this
sense, our framework may be considered as an extension to their model which
allows for the technological transfers aﬀecting some sectors of the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline
models corresponding to the three environments: one-sector autarky, external
ﬁnancing with full and limited enforcement. These models rely on the most
stringent assumption about the default punishment. Section 3 describes the
numerical algorithms for solving the models and analyzes the solutions for them.
Section 4 introduces the model with two-sector autarky which relies on a more
moderate assumption concerning the default punishment. Section 5 analyzes
the numerical solutions corresponding to the models with two-sector autarky
which diﬀer in the magnitude of technological transfers. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Baseline Model
The environments considered in the paper essentially share some features. There
are two agents: agent 1 who is risk averse and can be interpreted as a devel-
oping country and agent 2 who is risk neutral and represents the industrialized
countries. As in Marcet and Marimon (1992) the technologies that convert
investment into capital are non-linear and are aﬀected by a productivity shock.
2.1 Eﬃcient growth mechanism under full commitment
It is assumed that there are two sectors in the economy which will be called
domestic and foreign operated sector. In the case of external ﬁnancing due to
technological transfers the foreign operated sector will enjoy higher productivity
as compared with the domestic sector. This assumption can be justiﬁed along
the following lines. The technological transfers partially originate from the fact
that a part of capital inﬂows into a country will take form of FDI. It is often
argued in the literature that the positive spillovers from FDI only aﬀect certain
ﬁrms in the domestic economy (see G¨ org and Strobl, 2001). The set of ﬁrms
which are aﬀected by the technological transfers from the rest of the world will
be referred to as foreign operated sector.
In this environment, the eﬃcient growth mechanism, Γ, represents a state-
contingent investment and transfer plans Γ = {i1t,i2t,τt} which is obtained as a
solution to a dynamic principal-agent problem for a given set of initial conditions
and weights. The latter are comprised of the initial capital stocks k10,k20, the
initial productivity shock θ0, and the weight λ ∈ R+ assigned to the risk-averse













c1t − τt + i1t + i2t = f(k1t) + F(k2t), (2)
k1t+1 = (1 − δ)k1t + g(i1t,θt+1), (3)
5k2t+1 = (1 − δ)k2t + g(i2t,θt+1), (4)
with c1t ≥ 0,i1t,i2t ≥ 0,k10,k20,θ0 given.
In this speciﬁcation u(·) represents the instantaneous utility of the risk-averse
agent. We denote as f(·) and F(·) the production functions corresponding to
the domestic and foreign operated sectors of the economy. The function that
transforms units of investment into units of capital is denoted as g(·). The
consumption of the risk-averse agent is given by c1t, the transfers from the
risk-neutral agent to the risk averse one are denoted by τt. Investment in to the
two sectors are given by i1t and i2t, and the corresponding capital stocks by
k1t and k2t. The variable θt+1 represents an exogenous stochastic shock, the
realization of which is unknown at the time the investment decisions are made.
The following assumptions, relatively standard in the stochastic growth lit-
erature, will hold throughout the rest of the paper:1 (i) the utility function u(·)
of the agent 1 is strictly concave, twice diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes the Inada
conditions: limc→0 u0(c) = +∞,limc→∞ u0(c) = 0; (ii) the sectorial production
functions f(·) and F(·) are concave and diﬀerentiable; (iii) the exogenous sto-
chastic process θt is stationary and has bounded support; (iv) depreciation rate
δ ∈ [0,1]; (v) g(·,θ) is diﬀerentiable and concave.
A note on the interpretation of this model should be made. As in the model
of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) the development takes the form of the capital
accumulation in the existing sector considered as domestic as well as opening and
subsequent accumulation in a new sector in the economy considered as foreign
operated. The extent of the development in the domestically operated sector is
summarized by the capital stock k1t. Likewise, the extent of the development
in the foreign operated sector is summarized by the capital stock k2t an initial
value of which is lower than that of the domestic sector.
In addition to the equations (2), (3) and (4) the solution to the Program 1



















u0(c1t) = λ−1. (7)
The model discussed above is based on the assumption that the planner can
perfectly enforce both parties to follow the plan. In the remaining of the paper,
this assumption will be relaxed and a number of assumptions regarding incentive
compatibility will be considered. These assumptions will essentially diﬀer in the
extent of the punishment the risk-averse agent would have to endure should he
deviate from the plan.
1Similar assumptions appear e.g. in Marcet and Marimon (1992) and Jones and Manuelli
(1990).
2See Appendix A for the derivation of the ﬁrst order conditions corresponding to Program
1.
62.2 Eﬃcient growth mechanisms under limited commit-
ment
We begin with the most stringent assumption on the punishment in case of
violation of the contract. We will assume that in case of default the develop-
ing country will appropriate the capital stock corresponding to the domestically
operated sectors k1t. The newly opened foreign sector will no longer be produc-
tive. This assumption can be justiﬁed on the grounds that the newly opened
sector can be totally dependent on the technology transferred from the industri-
alized world. A similar assumption has been considered by Marcet and Marimon
(1998) within the framework of a partnership with limited commitment.
Hence, the failure to honor the contract will result in closing down the sector
which cannot be operated using domestically available technologies. In this case,
the country will switch to autarky and will stay there forever. The problem the












ct + it = f(kt), (9)
kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + g(it,θt+1), (10)
where ct ≥ 0,it,≥ 0, and the initial values k0,θ0 are given by the corresponding
values of capital stock of the domestically operated sector and the shock value at
the time of deviation. Using the arguments of standard dynamic programming
one can show3 the existence of the time invariant policy functions i(k,θ), c(k,θ)
and a value function V a(k,θ). Hence, the reservation value for the risk-averse
agent at time t is the utility of the autarkic solution V a(k1t,θt) given the capital
stock k1t and the productivity shock θt. The optimal allocations can be found
by solving the following planner’s problem with λ ∈ R+ and the participation













c1t − τt + i1t + i2t = f(k1t) + F(k2t), (12)
k1t+1 = (1 − δ)k1t + g(i1t,θt+1), (13)







≥ V a(k1t,θt), (15)
with c1t ≥ 0,i1t,i2t ≥ 0,k10,k20,θ0 given.
3See Appendix B for the solution to the dynamic programming problem under the autarky.
7Since the constraint (15) involves expected values of the future variables,
Program 2 is not a special case of the standard dynamic programming problems,
and the Bellman equation will not be satisﬁed. However, as shown by Marcet
and Marimon (1998) this problem falls into a general class of problems, which
can be cast into an alternative recursive framework. The recursive saddle point










βt {(λ + Mt−1)u(c1t) + (−τt)
+µt (u(c1t) − V a(k1t,θt))}
subject to (12)-(14) and
Mt = Mt−1 + µt, M−1 = 0, (16)
µt ≥ 0. (17)

















subject to (12)-(14), given µt ≥ 0, where β−tµt is the Lagrange multiplier
of (15) at t. The law of iterated expectations allows to imbed the conditional
expectations Et into E0. Furthermore, reordering the terms and introducing the
law of motion for Mt yields the above result.
As shown by Marcet and Marimon (1998), under certain assumptions 4 the
solution to the recursive saddle point problem obeys a saddle point functional











c1 − τ + i1 + i2 = f(k1) + F(k2), (19)
k0
j = (1 − δ)kj + g(ij,θ0), for j = 1,2 (20)
M0 = M + µ, (21)
c1,i1,i2 ≥ 0, (22)
for all (k1,k2,M,θ) and such that W(k10,k20,M−1,θ0) is the value of Program
2. The policy correspondence associated with the above saddle point functional









4Marcet and Marimon (1998) state some interiority conditions needed for the existence of
the saddle point problem. These are trivially satisﬁed in our framework.
8subject to (19) - (22).
The key results demonstrated by Marcet and Marimon (1998) ensures that
the optimal solution of Program 2 satisﬁes (c1t,τt,i1t,i2t,µt) = ψ (k1t,k2t,Mt−1,θt)
for all t with the initial conditions (k10,k20,0,θ0). That is there exist a time
invariant policy correspondence ψ such that only the values of a small number
of past variables (k1t,k2t,Mt−1,θt) matter. Hence, the problem is now in a
recursive framework the solution to which can now be obtained from studying
the saddle point functional equation.
Denoting γ1t and γ2t the Lagrange multipliers of the constraints (13) and
(14), the ﬁrst order conditions for this problem become:


















(k1t,θt) + γ1t − β(1 − δ)Et [γ1t+1] = 0, (26)



















in addition to the technological constraints (12)-(14), the law of motion (16) for
the co-state variable Mt, and non-negativity of the Lagrange multiplier µt ≥ 0.
3 Solutions to the growth models
In this section we will present the numerical solutions for various models of
this paper as well as describe the algorithms for obtaining them. To obtain the
numerical solution to the models we will rely on the parameterized expectation
approach. With some exceptions, the functional forms utilized here are similar
to those of Marcet and Marimon (1992). These are:
f(k1t) = Akα
1t and F(k2t) = e Akα
2t, (30)






1t /(γ + 1), (32)
logθt = ρlogθt−1 + εt, (33)
where {εt} are independent normally distributed random variables with zero
mean and variance σ2
ε.
93.1 Solving the problem with full enforcement
With the chosen functional forms the optimality conditions for the case of full





















1t = λ−1, (36)
c1t − τt + i1t + i2t = Akα
1t + e Akα
2t, (37)








The ﬁrst step of the PEA is to substitute the conditional expectations in (34)
and (35) by the ﬂexible functional forms that depend on the state variables and







where ω = (ω1;ω2). Reliance on the exponential polynomial guarantees that the
left hand side of (34) and (35) would be positive. Increasing the degree of the
polynomial would allow to approximate the solution with arbitrary accuracy5.
The algorithm for solving the model takes the following steps:
• (Step I) Fix the initial conditions and draw a series of {θt}
T
t=1 that obeys
(33) with T suﬃciently large.
• (Step II) For a given ω substitute the conditional expectations in (34) and
(35) to yield:
(1 + iit)
2 = δψ(ωi;k1t(ω),k2t(ω),θt) for i = 1,2 (41)
• (Step III) Using the realizations of θt obtain recursively from (41) and
(36)-(39) the series {c1t(ω),τt(ω),i1t(ω),i2t(ω),k1t(ω),k2t(ω)} of the en-
dogenous variables for this particular value of ω.
5The fact that PEA can provide arbirtary accuracy if the approximation function is reﬁned
and a proof of convergence to the correct solution are given in Marcet and Marshall (1994).
In practice the choice of degree of the exponential polynomial can be guided by the test for
accuracy in simulations proposed by den Haan and Marcet (1994). Certain practical issues
on dealing with higher-order polynomials in the approximation function are discussed in den
Haan and Marcet (1990). Some additional details on dealing with several endogenous state
variables in PEA algorithms are given in Marcet and Lorenzoni (1998).
10• (Step IV) The next step involves running two separate non-linear regres-
sions. The role of the dependent variables will be performed by the ex-
pressions inside the conditional expectation in the RHS of (34) and (35).
Namely, the ’dependent variables’ Y1t(ω) and Y2t(ω) would take form
Y1t(ω) ≡ a(θt+1 + s)
∞ X
j=0
(β(1 − δ))jAα(k1t+1+j(ω))α−1, (42)
Y2t(ω) ≡ a(θt+1 + s)
∞ X
j=0
(β(1 − δ))j e Aα(k2t+1+j(ω))α−1. (43)
Now, letting Si(ω) be the result of the following regression:
Yit(ω) = exp(ξi
1 + ξi
2 logk1t(ω) + ξi
3 logk2t(ω) + ξi
4 logθt) + ηit, (44)





• (Step V) The ﬁnal step involves using an iterative algorithm to ﬁnd the
ﬁxed point of S, and the set of coeﬃcients ωf = S (ωf). Once the ﬁxed
point is found one can proceed to recover the simulated series of the en-
dogenous variables {c1t(ωf),τt(ωf),i1t(ωf),i2t(ωf),k1t(ωf),k2t(ωf)} con-
sistent with the solution.
3.2 Solving the problem with limited commitment
This section shows how to solve the model with limited enforcement using PEA
adapted from Marcet and Marimon (1992). The main diﬀerence of this algo-
rithm from the one discussed in the previous section is that here the partic-
ipation constraint might be binding in some periods and slack in the others.
Furthermore, there is one more expectation to parameterize and an additional
(co-)state variable Mt−1 to include into the parameterization.


















− V a(k1t,θt) ≥ 0, (46)
c
γ
1t = 1/(λ + µt + Mt−1), (47)
Mt = Mt−1 + µt, (48)
c1t − τt + i1t + i2t = Akα
1t + e Akα
2t, (49)
k1t+1 = (1 − δ)k1t + a(θt+1 + s)i1t/(1 + i1t) + b, (50)






















(β(1 − δ))j e Aα(k2t+1+j)α−1

, (53)
in addition to the inequality constraint µt ≥ 0 and the initial conditions6.
In order to solve this model with PEA the algorithm described for the case
of full enforcement should be modiﬁed in the following way. First, in step II
parameterize the conditional expectations in (45), (52) and (53) to yield
(1 + iit(ω))
2 = δψ(ωi;k1t(ω),k2t(ω),Mt−1(ω),θt) for i = 1,2, (54)
µt

u(c1t(ω)) + βψ(ω3;k1t(ω),k2t(ω),Mt−1(ω),θt) − V a(k1t(ω),θt)

= 0, (55)
where ω = (ω1,ω2,ω3).
In step III the participation constraint should be taken into account. One
way to proceed is to initially assume that the participation constraint is not
binding, then µt(ω) = 0, Mt(ω) = Mt−1(ω), and the solution for c1t(ω) follows
from (47). For this solution one has to check whether the constraint is indeed
satisﬁed, that is if
u(c1t(ω)) + βψ(ω3;k1t(ω),k2t(ω),Mt−1(ω),θt) ≥ V a(k1t(ω),θt). (56)
If that is the case one can proceed by solving for the rest of the endogenous
variables from (54) and the feasibility constraints (49) - (51). Otherwise, the
participation constraint must be binding, that is
u(c1t(ω)) + βψ(ω3;k1t(ω),k2t(ω),Mt−1(ω),θt) = V a(k1t(ω),θt), (57)
from which the solution for c1t(ω) follows. The value of the multiplier µt(ω)
then follows from (47), the value of Mt(ω) from the law of motion (48), and the
rest of the endogenous variables from (54) and (49) - (51).








where the ’dependent variables’ are given by











6Derivation of the latter optimality conditions takes the following steps. From (26) and
(27) using recursive substitution and the law of iterated expectations yields the following



















(β (1 − δ))jF0(k2t+j)
#
.
Substituting the the above expressions into (24) and (25) respectively, using again the law of
iterated expectations and the functional forms for the production and investment functions
yields the optimality conditions (52) and (53).
12Y2t(ω) ≡ a(θt+1 + s)
∞ X
j=0





The last step is similar to the one in the the case of full enforcement.
A few notes on the algorithm should be made. First, in this algorithm
µt will be positive by construction. Second, step IV involves calculation of
the derivative of the value function in the autarky with the respect to its ﬁrst
argument. Marcet and Marimon (1992) provide derivation of this derivative
which is convenient for computational purposes. This computational algorithm
is given in Appendix B.
3.3 Numerical solutions to the models
In this section we present the simulated series for the models discussed above.
First, a short note should be made on the parameterization of the model. The
values of the parameters used in the simulations except for the productivity
parameters A and e A are similar to those of Marcet and Marimon (1992). This
concerns all the models considered throughout the paper. The choice of values
for the depreciation rate of the capital (δ) and the discount factor (β) allows to
interpret one period as a year. The values of the parameters are summarized in
Table 1.
[insert Table 1 about here.]
A note on the weight λ in the planner’s problem should be made. In all the
reported simulations the value of λ is set to make expected discounted transfers
at t = 0 equal to zero. This would ensure that the series reported corresponds
to the equilibrium contract.
[insert Figure 1 about here.]
The simulation results for the environment with full enforcement are pre-
sented in Figure 1. These results will be compared with those obtained in the
autarkic environment (see Figure 2 and Table 2). The initial value of capital
stock in the domestic sector is set to one, while the foreign operated sector is
initially assumed to be nonexistent.7
[insert Figure 2 and Table 2 about here.]
The results can be summarized in the following way. First, as expected, the
consumption of the risk-averse agent in the PO environment is constant both
in the steady state and along the transition path. All the risk is born by the
risk neutral agent, which is also reﬂected in the volatility of the transfers in the
steady state.
7This assumption is made to make autarky directly comparable with other environments.
In addition, as in Marcet and Marimon (1992) we assume that the initial capital stock in the
autarkic environment equals to one.
13Second, under full enforcement the developing country borrows heavily dur-
ing the initial periods in order to boost investment in both sectors of the econ-
omy. Due to the access to external ﬁnancing, the mean growth rate of output
raises from 2.4% to 8.4% during the ﬁrst 15 periods, and from 1.4% to 3.8%
during the ﬁrst 35 periods.
Third, during the initial periods the investment rates in the full enforce-
ment environment are signiﬁcantly higher than those in the autarky. Under
perfect enforcement, the investment rates decline as the capital accumulates in
both sectors. The opposite is observed in the autarkic environment. Higher
investment level in the foreign sector than that in the domestic one is due to
the lower initial capital stock in the former. Remarkably, in the steady state
the investment rates under PO environment are more volatile than those in the
autarky.
Finally, under full enforcement access to external ﬁnancial opportunities
results in a welfare gain equivalent to a 92% ”increase in consumption”. By
”increase in consumption” we refer to a permanent increase in consumption
that would equate the present value under the autarky with the present values
achieved under other environments
Remarkably, all of the results reported for the PO environment are also
applicable to the model with limited commitment corresponding to Program 2.
The implication of this ﬁnding is that technological gains from external ﬁnancing
opportunities may eliminate the risk of default.
A comment should be made on this ﬁnding according to which the solutions
to the case of full enforcement and limited enforcement coincide. The fact that
participation constraint turns out to be never binding can driven by the as-
sumption of the punishment in case of deviation from the optimal plan, which
is extremely severe. Should the country default it will lose not only the techno-
logical advantage and capital accumulated in the newly opened sector but also
a possibility to develop this sector on its own. In the remaining of the paper we
will address the issue of default punishment which might give some qualitatively
diﬀerent results.
4 A Model with Two-sector Autarky
In this section, we will modify the assumption concerning the punishment in-
curred by the developing country in case of deviation from the optimal plan. It
will be assumed that failure to follow the plan would result in the loss of the
technological advantage in the foreign operated sector8. However, the sector
will remain productive with the productivity level of the domestically operated
sector. Furthermore, the country will preserve the accumulated capital in both
sectors. In this formulation, the optimization problem the agent would face in












8This assumption is close in spirit to the contributions of Cohen and Sachs (1986) or Eaton
and Gersovitz (1994) where foreign debt repudiation results in permanent loss of productive
eﬃciency.
14subject to
c1t + i1t + i2t = f(k1t) + f(k2t), (63)
kjt+1 = (1 − δ)kjt + g(ijt,θt+1), for j = 1,2 (64)
with c1t ≥ 0,i1t,i2t ≥ 0,k10,k20,θ0 given.
The arguments from the standard dynamic programming will ensure the ex-
istence of the time invariant policy functions i1(k1,k2,θ),i2(k1,k2,θ),c(k1,k2,θ)
and a value function V a2(k1,k2,θ). Hence, the reservation value for the agent 1
at time t is the utility of the autarkic solution V a2(k1t,k2t,θt) given the capi-
tal stock accumulated in the domestically operated sector k1t, the capital stock
corresponding to the foreign sector k2t and the productivity shock θt
9.
Under these less stringent assumptions on the default punishment, the op-
timal allocations can be found by solving the following planner’s problem with













c1t − τt + i1t + i2t = f(k1t) + F(k2t), (66)







≥ V a2(k1t,k2t,θt), (68)
with c1t ≥ 0,i1t,i2t ≥ 0,k10,k20,θ0 given.
Once again, in the above framework, the steady state distributions of capital
will diﬀer under full and limited enforcement due to the technology transfers.
This feature would distinguish the present setup from the framework of Marcet
and Marimon (1992) as far as the growth incentives for integration are con-
cerned.
Similar to Program 2, the present problem can be cast into recursive frame-
work the solution to which will be obtained from studying the saddle point
functional equation. Denoting γ1t and γ2t the Lagrange multipliers of the con-
straints (67), the ﬁrst order conditions for this problem become:


















(k1t,k2t,θt) + γ1t − β(1 − δ)Et [γ1t+1] = 0, (72)
























in addition to the technological constraints (66)-(68), the law of motion for the
co-state variable Mt,
Mt = Mt−1 + µt, M−1 = 0 (76)
and non-negativity of the Lagrange multiplier µt ≥ 0.
Substituting the chosen functional forms and simplifying the ﬁrst order con-



















− V a2(k1t,k2t,θt) ≥ 0, (78)
c
γ
1t = 1/(λ + µt + Mt−1), (79)
Mt = Mt−1 + µt, (80)
c1t − τt + i1t + i2t = Akα
1t + e Akα
2t, (81)






























in addition to non-negativity of the Lagrange multiplier µt ≥ 0 and the initial
conditions.
165 Characterization of equilibria
We solve the model in Program 4 with PEA using an algorithm similar to the
one described for the model in Program 2. As before, in all simulations the TFP
parameter of the domestic sector (A) was set to one. When it comes to the TFP
parameter of the foreign operated sector ( e A), we consider three representative
cases which diﬀer in the magnitude of the technological transfers.
The simulation results are summarized in Figures 3-5 and Tables 3-5. We
compare three institutional environments: the autarky equilibrium correspond-
ing to Program 3 denoted as ”au” in Figures 3-5, Pareto optimum allocation
with perfect enforcement denoted as ”po”, and the equilibrium with limited
enforcement corresponding to Program 4 denoted as ”pc”. For these ﬁgures we
plot the ﬁrst 50 periods as representative of the transition from the low level
of capital to the steady state, and periods 100 to 200 as representative of the
steady state distribution.
5.1 Equilibria with no technological transfers
First, we consider the case with no technological transfers whatsoever, which in
terms of TFP’s corresponds to e A = A = 1. This case is similar in structure to
the growth models with full information of Marcet and Marimon (1992). Under
lack of commitment, the behavior of the developing country is aﬀected by the
two opposing forces. On on hand, the country wants to default on its debt,
something which would imply switching to autarky and staying there forever.
Unlike the autarky assumption of the Program 2, Program 4 implies that the
country would still be in a position to develop the foreign sector on its own with
the expropriated capital to begin with. The opposing force is the threat of the
punishment for defaulting. In this case, it is the loss of possibility to borrow in
order either enhance growth or to smooth consumption against the unforeseen
shocks or along the growth path. As before, the characterization of the capital
accumulation and transfers during the transition can be obtained only from the
numerical solutions, which are summarized in Figure 3 and Table 3.
[insert Figure 3 and Table 3 about here.]
An important feature of this case is that the steady state distributions of
capital are quite similar across all the three environments, in both sectors. They
are actually identical in the PC and PO environments as are the distributions
of the corresponding investment rates. As reported in Table 3, the steady state
capital stock in the autarky environment is slightly higher on average than in
the other environments in either of the sectors. The reason for that is that in
autarky the country has to self-insure against the cyclical ﬂuctuations of output
and the only source of self-insurance is the capital.
In each of the sectors, the investment is more volatile under full enforcement
than under the autarky. This feature is similar to the one reported by Marcet
and Marimon (1992), and represents an example where an increase in volatility
of investment is desirable.
Despite absence of any technological spillovers, the positive eﬀect of the
access to external ﬁnancing on growth is rather substantial under full enforce-
ment. The growth rates go from 2.5% to 3% during the ﬁrst 15 periods. Yet,
17this eﬀect practically disappears once the assumption of perfect enforceability
of contracts is relaxed. The overall gains, measured as permanent increase in
consumption that would equate the present value under the autarky with the
present values achieved under other regimes, diﬀer signiﬁcantly in the PO and
PC environments. Failure to perfectly enforce contracts reduces the welfare
gains by the factor of 25. In fact, during the transition the consumption paths
under autarky and under limited enforcement are very similar. As can be seen
from Figure 3, the key diﬀerence is that the consumption series under PC is
smoother than that under the autarky during the transition. Furthermore, it
is outright ﬂat in the steady state while the consumption under autarky keeps
ﬂuctuating even in the steady state. Hence, with no technological transfers,
the access to the external ﬁnancing under limited enforcement allows to smooth
out variation of output but not keep constant consumption along the transition.
The possibility to smooth consumption through external ﬁnancing results in
the minor welfare gain under limited commitment. As in Marcet and Marimon
(1992) enforcement constrains result in negligible transfers and severely reduce
growth opportunities.
5.2 Equilibria with technological transfers of medium mag-
nitude
The case with the technological transfers of medium magnitude is deﬁned by
two characteristic features. First, in the environments which grant access to
the external ﬁnancing, the foreign operated sector is more productive than the
domestic one10. Second, the productivity diﬀerences between the sectors are
low enough to guarantee that the participation constraint is binding in some
periods. The key feature of this case is that the productivity beneﬁts introduce
a gap between the steady state capital levels in the economy with and without
external ﬁnancing. The latter feature makes the punishment for default more
severe that in the previous case but not severe enough to eliminate risk of
default. The characteristics of the eﬃcient accumulation mechanisms under the
three considered institutional setups are summarized in Figure 4 and Table 4.
[insert Figure 4 and Table 4 about here.]
The simulations demonstrate several distinctive features of the setup which
encompasses both productivity beneﬁts from external ﬁnancing and risk of de-
fault. These can be summarized in the following way.
First, despite the presence of the default risk in the environment with limited
commitment the capital movements from and to the developing country are no
longer negligible. This result distinguishes the present setup from both the
equilibrium with no technological transfers discussed in the previous section as
well as the framework of Marcet and Marimon (1992). This feature allows to
conclude that presence of the default risk is not inconsistent with the capital
ﬂows of substantial magnitude.
Second, under limited enforcement the developing country borrows not only
in order to smooth cyclical variation in consumption but also in order to invest
heavier during the transition and hence foster growth. Remarkably, the bor-
rower boosts investment in all productive sectors and not only those aﬀected
10In terms of sectoral TFPs the case reported here corresponds to A = 1 and e A = 1.1.
18by the technological transfers. Once again, in this prediction the current case
diﬀers from the case with no technological diﬀusion, be it two-sector model dis-
cussed above or one-sector framework of Marcet and Marimon (1992). That is,
borrowing with an objective to promote growth can be an equilibrium outcome
even in the environment with present risk of default.
Third, the behavior of the consumption path under limited enforcement is
rather peculiar. During a few initial periods, the consumption path is ﬂat. Al-
though it is still lower that the consumption level under full enforcement, the
series is well above the autarky consumption. That is, in this environment con-
sumption smoothing along the growth path is no longer absent. As the capital
accumulates, the participation constraint starts binding at certain period. After
that the consumption in the limited commitment environment rises every time
the incentive compatibility constraint binds. As in the case with no technologi-
cal transfers, the shape of the consumption series reminds that of the autarky.
However, during the the transition there is a diminishing wedge between the two
series. This can be attributed to the diminishing diﬀerence in the accumulated
capital stock in the environments with full and limited enforcement. As in the
case with no technological diﬀusion, under limited enforcement the steady state
distribution is characterized by a ﬂat consumption schedule which can lie either
above or below the autarky path.
Since the default risk is still present in the limited enforcement environment
during the transition the paths of investment, transfers, and capital stock diﬀer
from those in the Pareto optimum. Transfers from abroad to the developing
country are lower in this case relative to the full enforcement outcome. The
investment rates inherit the same feature. In fact, in the sector unaﬀected
by the productivity beneﬁts the investment series falls rather quickly to the
autarky level. However, due to the heavy investment during the initial periods,
the capital stock under limited enforcement stays above the autarky capital
stock during the transition. The latter result holds for all sectors including the
domestic one.
Another regularity concerns the overall capital stock of the economy in the
steady state. As shown by Marcet and Marimon (1992) the capital stock of a
country in an environment with limited commitment is lower than that in the
autarky. The driving force behind this result is the need to use capital as the
only means of self-insurance in the autarkic environment. The similar result is
obtained in our framework in the case with no technological diﬀusion. However,
when the technological transfers are present, this conclusion may no longer
be true. Since the productivity of the foreign operated sector is higher under
limited enforcement than in the autarky, so is the capital stock in the foreign
sector. Hence, whether the overall capital stock will be higher in the autarky
than under limited commitment depends on which of the two forces dominates.
For instance, in the case with transfers of medium magnitude reported in Table
4, under limited enforcement the capital stock in the domestic sector is lower
than that in the autarky. The converse is true for the foreign operated sector.
Some characteristic features of the solutions following from our framework
are in line with a number of documented empirical regularities. For instance,
Marcet and Marimon (1992) state that the observed cross-country diﬀerences
in borrowing patterns and rich structure of capital ﬂows ﬁnd little explanation
in the models of sustained growth. On the contrary, our framework predicts
that under limited commitment, the extent to which a developing country will
19borrow depends on the magnitude of productivity gains associated with external
ﬁnancing relative to the productivity in the autarky.
Another regularity is reported by Gertler and Rogoﬀ (1990), who document
that the level of foreign debt in the developing countries is positively correlated
with their GNP. This observation is in line with the predictions of our model as
well. Indeed, countries which highly beneﬁt from technological transfers in the
foreign operated sector will be able not only to increase production due to the
productivity gains but also due to the higher capital stock in all sectors. The
latter stems from increased investment levels ﬁnanced through transfers from
abroad. Such countries will tend to have both higher income level and higher
level of foreign debt.
5.3 Equilibria with technological transfer of high magni-
tude
When the magnitude of technological transfers is high enough the punishment
for default becomes so severe that the participation constraint turns out to be
never binding. Hence, the solution under limited commitment and that under
perfect enforcement will coincide. This compels us to reiterate the conclusion
obtained earlier from the model with one-sector autarky. Our results suggest
that presence of technological beneﬁts associated with external ﬁnancing may
eliminate risk of default. The latter is true even though these beneﬁts are
enjoyed only by some sectors of the developing economy. The simulation results
for the case with technological transfer of high magnitude are presented in Figure
5 and Table 5.
[insert Figure 5 and Table 5 about here.]
One ﬁnal note will be made concerning the relation between the productivity
beneﬁts and the corresponding welfare gains. In the reported example the TFP
level in the foreign operated sector ( e A) is set to 1.35. This particular choice is
motivated by the desire to ﬁnd the lowest level of e A, which would ensure that
the participation constraint does not bind. In this case, the welfare gain, mea-
sured as a permanent increase in consumption that would equate the present
value of utility under the autarky with the present values achieved in the other
environments, is large. It corresponds to the increase in consumption of 26%.
Notice that these gains are driven by two forces. On one hand, it is higher
productivity of the foreign operated sectors under PC than that under autarky
which takes the credit. On the other hand, the technological transfers increase
the default punishment and by that facilitate borrowing during the initial pe-
riods in order to foster growth. The importance of the latter force for welfare
improvement is more obvious in the case with no transfers reported in Table 3.
In the absence of technological diﬀusion, failure to enforce contracts results in
a welfare loss corresponding to change in consumption of 3.4%. With introduc-
tion of moderate technological transfers, corresponding to the TFP level in the
foreign operated sector ( e A) of 1.1, the diﬀerence between welfare gains under
full and limited enforcement falls by more than a half and becomes 1.6%. This
reduction of relative welfare beneﬁts can be attributed to an increase in the
punishment for default.
20To summarize, even moderate technological beneﬁts substantially reduce the
negative eﬀect on welfare of the failure to perfectly enforce borrowing contracts.
That is, in our framework technological transfers play a role of an important
enforcement mechanism.
6 Conclusion
The main objective of this study was to enrich the framework of Marcet and
Marimon (1992), which considers the eﬀects of alternative ﬁnancing opportuni-
ties on economic growth under lack of commitment. The key novelty is that the
access to the external ﬁnancing is assumed to result in technological transfers
to the developing countries from the rest of the world. We study a two-sector
growth model in the environments which diﬀer to the extent the borrowing con-
tracts with the rest of the world are being enforced. Furthermore, we examine
diﬀerent assumptions concerning the default punishment and their implications
for growth, welfare and borrowing patterns. The principal conclusions of this
paper can be summarized in the following way:
First, our model suggests that technological transfers to a developing country
from the rest of the world may eliminate risk of default even though they aﬀect
only some sectors of the economy.
Second, we conclude that the existence of substantial capital ﬂows from the
developed to developing countries is not inconsistent with the presence of the
default risk. In this respect predictions of our model distinguish themselves
from those of Marcet and Marimon (1992).
Third, we overcome the diﬃculty that the models of sustained growth have
in explaining the rich structure of observed capital ﬂows and the ”wide spec-
trum of borrowing patterns across low- and middle-income countries” Marcet
and Marimon (1992:221). Our framework predicts that under limited commit-
ment the pattern of capital ﬂows depends heavily on the productivity beneﬁts
associated with the external ﬁnancing opportunities.
Forth, in our framework even moderate technological beneﬁts associated with
external ﬁnancing opportunities may substantially reduce the negative eﬀect on
the welfare of the failure to perfectly enforce contracts. In this respect, we con-
clude that technological transfers may play a role of an important enforcement
mechanism.
Finally, we show that absence of technological diﬀusion in an environment
with limited commitment may result in scarce capital ﬂows to less developed
countries and substantially reduce their growth opportunities. On the over
hand, presence of technological transfers in this environment will induce a de-
veloping country to use foreign capital to both smooth consumption against
unforeseen shocks as well as along the growth path. Moreover, along the tran-
sition the foreign capital will be used to invest more heavily in all the sectors of
the economy including those unaﬀected by the spillovers. The latter will result
in faster growth as well as more substantial welfare gains.
21Appendix A. Derivation of the ﬁrst order condi-
tions corresponding to full enforcement environ-
ment.
Using the arguments of standard dynamic programming (see Stockey, Lucas and
Prescott, 1989) one can show the existence of the time invariant policy functions
i1(k1,k2,θ), i2(k1,k2,θ) and a value function V (k1,k2,θ). The Lagrangian for




βt {[λu(c1t) + (−τt)] − λ1t [c1t − τt + i1t + i2t − f(k1t) − F(k2t)]
−µ1t(k1t − (1 − δ)k1t−1 − g(i1t−1,θt) − µ2t(k2t − (1 − δ)k2t−1 − g(i2t−1,θt)},
where λ1t,µ1t and µ2t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the con-
straints (2), (3) and (4). The corresponding f.o.c. are given by
λu0(c1t) = λ1t, (85)















λ1tf0(k1t) − µ1t + (1 − δ)βEt [µ1t+1] = 0, (89)
λ1tF0(k2t) − µ2t + (1 − δ)βEt [µ2t+1] = 0. (90)





















The condition (6) is derived using the similar argument from (90),(88), and (86).
The condition (7) follows directly from (85) and (86).
Appendix B. Approximating the value function
and its derivative for the one–sector autarky.
The Bellman equation corresponding to the one-sector autarky is given by
V a(k,θ) = max
(c,i)∈A(k)





+ : c + i = f(k)
	
, (94)
k0 = (1 − δ)k + g(i,θ0). (95)
Denoting by V 0(k,θ) the derivative of the value function with the respect to its









Applying the theorem of Benveniste - Scheinkman 11 yields the following con-
dition for the derivative:
V a0(k,θ) = u0(c)f0(k) + β(1 − δ)E [V a0(k0,θ0) | θ]. (97)
Rewriting the latter in the sequence form, using recursive substitution and the
law of iterated expectations yields








Now, rewriting (96) in the sequence form, using (98) and the law of iterated










In order to approximate the value function and its derivative the following
algorithm can be used. First, parameterize the conditional expectation in (98)
as
ψ(ω,kt,θt) = exp(Pn(log(kt),log(θt))), (100)
where Pn is a polynomial of degree n. Then, run a non-linear regression, which
for n = 2 takes the form:
Yt = exp(ω1 + ω2 log(kt) + ω3 log(θt) + ω4 (log(kt))
2
+ω5 log(kt)log(θt) + ω6 (log(θt))
2) + ηt, (101)
where the dependent variable Yt is given by the expression inside the conditional
expectation in (98) evaluated the the autarky solution {ct,kt}
∞
t=0 .
A similar approach can be used to approximate the value function, except the
parameterization of the conditional expectation should change to ψ(ω,kt,θt) =
−exp(Pn(log(kt),log(θt))) since utility of the agent 1 takes only negative val-
ues.
11see Stockey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) or Marcet and Marimon (1992) for details.
23Appendix C. Derivation of the ﬁrst order condi-
tions for the two-sector autarky in Program 3.













c1t + i1t + i2t = f(k1t) + f(k2t), (103)
kjt+1 = (1 − δ)kjt + g(ijt,θt+1), for j = 1,2, (104)
with c1t ≥ 0,i1t,i2t ≥ 0,k10,k20,θ0 given.




βt{u(ct) − λ[c1t − τt + i1t + i2t − f(k1t) − f(k2t)]
−µ1t(k1t − (1 − δ)k1t−1 − g(i1t−1,θt)
−µ2t(k2t − (1 − δ)k2t−1 − g(i2t−1,θt)},
where λ1t,µ1t and µ2t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the con-
straints (103) and (104).The corresponding f.o.c. are given by







= 0, for j = 1,2, (106)
λtf0(kjt) − µjt + (1 − δ)βEt [µjt+1] = 0, for j = 1,2. (107)








, for j = 1,2, (108)










for j = 1,2.
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26Table 1. Parameterization of the models 
 
Factor share of capital  α = 0.5 
Risk-aversion parameter of agent 1  γ = - 3 
Discount factor  β = 0.95 
Autocorrelation parameter of log(θ  t)  ρ = 0.95 
Standard deviation of innovations of log(θ  t)  σε = 0.03 
Depreciation rate  δ = 0.1 
Constants in the investment functions  a = 0.6; s = 0.2; b = 0.13 
Note: Throughout the paper the values of the parameters used in the simulations except for 





Table 2. Simulation results: the models with one-sector autarky (Ã = 1.00) 
 
Model  Utility of 
the  
agent 1 
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(15 periods) 
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(35 periods) 
Mean of capital  




AU -7.44  2.41%  1.38%  2.478  - 
PO, PC1  -2.01  8.44%  3.80%  2.467  92.20% 
Note: The institutional environments considered are the one-sector autarky corresponding to Program (AU), the 
environment with perfect enforcement in Program 1 (PO), and the limited commitment environment in Program 2 
(PC1). The productivity levels of domestic and foreign operated sectors are set to be identical. The utility of the agent 
1 is measured at Time 0 using many independent replications of the model conditioning on θ 0 = 1, and k10 = 1 in case 
of autarky and k10 = 1, k20 = 0 in case of the two sector models. "Mean of growth rate of output" refers to the mean 
across independent realizations during the first 15 and 35 periods respectively. The "Increase in consumptions" refers 
to the permanent increase in consumption that would equate the present value under the autarky with the present 
values achieved under other environments. 
  
Table 3. Simulation results: the case with no technological transfers (Ã = 1.00) 
 
Model  Utility of 
the  
agent 1 
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(15 periods) 
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(35 periods) 
Mean of capital in 
domestic/foreign 
sector (steady state) 
Increase in 
consumption
AU3 -1.861  2.455%  1.381%  2.470  /  2.470  - 
PO -1.734  3.035%  1.463%  2.466  /  2.466  3.58% 
PC -1.856  2.470%  1.384%  2.466  /  2.466  0.14% 
Note: The case with no technological transfers corresponds to the setup when the productivity levels of domestic and 
foreign operated sectors are identical. The institutional environments considered are the two-sector autarky in 
Program 3 (AU3), the environment with perfect enforcement in Program 1 (PO), and the limited commitment 
environment in Program 4 (PC). "Mean of growth rate of output" refers to the mean across independent realizations 
during the first 15 and 35 periods respectively. The utility of the agent 1 is measured at Time 0 using many 
independent replications of the model conditioning on θ 0 = 1, and k10 = 1.1, k20 = 0.9. The "Increase in consumptions" 
refers to the permanent increase in consumption that would equate the present value under the autarky with the 
present values achieved under other environments. 
 
 
Table 4. Simulation results: the case of technological transfers of medium magnitude (Ã = 1.10) 
 
Model  Utility of 
the  
agent 1 
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(15 periods) 
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(35 periods) 
Mean of capital in 
domestic/foreign 
sector (steady state) 
Increase in 
consumption
AU3 -1.861  2.455%  1.381%  2.470  /  2.470  - 
PO -1.542  3.161%  1.523%  2.467  /  2.641  9.87% 
PC -1.588  2.787%  1.462%  2.465  /  2.639  8.26% 
Note: The case with no the case of technological transfers of medium magnitude corresponds to the setup when the 
productivity levels of foreign operated sectors is higher than that of the domestic sector. However, the productivity 
differences are not big enough to eliminate risk of default in the environment with limited commitment. The rest is 
similar to Table 3. 
 
 
Table 5. Simulation results: the case of technological transfers of high magnitude (Ã = 1.35) 
 
Model  Utility of 
the  
agent 1 
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(15 periods) 
Mean of growth 
rate of output  
(35 periods) 
Mean of capital in 
domestic/foreign 
sector (steady state) 
Increase in 
consumption
AU3 -1.861  2.455%  1.381%  2.470  /  2.470  - 
PO  -1.168 3.450%    2.467  /  3.016 26.22% 
PC  -1.168 3.450%    2.467  /  3.016 26.22% 
Note: The case with no the case of technological transfers of high magnitude corresponds to the setup when the 
productivity levels of foreign operated sectors is higher than that of the domestic sector. Moreover, the productivity 
differences are big enough to eliminate risk of default in the environment with limited commitment. The rest is 
similar to Table 3. 
 Figure 1. 
Efficient accumulation mechanism under full enforcement. 
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 Figure 2. 
The model with one-sector autarky: efficient accumulation mechanisms 
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 Figure 3. 
The model with two-sector autarky: no technological transfers. 
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 Figure 4. 
The model with two-sector autarky: technological transfers of medium magnitude. 
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 Figure 5. 
The model with two-sector autarky: technological transfers of high magnitude. 
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